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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of modern times, taste was seen as a sort of sense 
of sociability, indistinctly moral and aesthetic. Why, during the 
eighteenth century did it become exclusively the sense of beauty? 
To understand this change, this article maintains that we must 
consider the great revolution, which affected the idea of beauty 
between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, that is to 
say the end of the metaphysical conception of beauty. We must 
analyse the phenomenon of beauty aestheticisation produced by 
the modern subjectivist, psychological and empirical perspective. 
The aestheticisation of taste is one of the consequences of the 
underground ontological revolution, which led to a transformation 
of the transcendental essences in human values. When beauty is 
nothing more than beauty, and does not exist without a sensitive 
experience, one needs a sensitive faculty which enables one to 
grasp beauty, or more precisely, which gives birth to beauty, seeing 
beauty as no longer having a proper ontological consistency. 
KEYWORDS: Taste, Beauty, Disinterestedness, Convertibility of 
Transcendentals, Modern Scientific Revolution
During the eighteenth century, taste as a sense of beauty was the 
subject of a great number of essays. It is the topic of Bouhours’ 
Manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages de l’esprit (1668), of 
Dubos’ Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture (1719), of 
Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue (1725), of Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750), or, of course, of 
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). The word “taste” appeared 
in the very title of numerous books or opuscules, among others 
Montesquieu’s Essai sur le goût (1757), Hume’s Of the Standard of 
Taste (1757), Burke’s Introduction on Taste (1759), or Alexander 
Gerard’s Essay on Taste (1759). 
For all that, the eighteenth century did not create the figurative 
sense of the word: this figurative use already existed in Antiquity, 
for instance in Cicero’s or Quintilian’s works. Nevertheless, the 
spread of this figurative use did not occur until modern times. 
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From this point of view, Baltazar Gracian is usually regarded as 
one of the most important authors. He published Oraculo manual y 
arte de prudencia in Spain in 1647, which was translated into French 
by Amelot de Houssaie under the title L’homme de cour in 1684. It is 
true that in this book Gracian uses the word “taste” in a figurative 
sense. But not yet in the sense of “sense of beauty”. The book con-
sists of a whole of maxims formally similar to La Rochefoucault’s 
Maximes, describing good manners, how to behave and to act ac-
cording to humanist and catholic values in the aristocratic world. 
L’homme de cour is a guide to good conduct, an art of prudence; 
it shows how to live honestly and happily at court, avoiding traps 
and temptations. It deals with questions of reputation, richness, 
and passions to avoid. What is taste in this context, and what does 
the word mean? Gracian uses the expression gusto relevante, fine 
taste, and he defined it as a sort of spiritual discernment. So de-
fined, taste is a sort of capacity, both ethical and aesthetical. This 
use of the word “taste” bears the marks of the mystical sense the 
notion had in Bernard de Clairvaux’s Sermons sur le Cantique des 
cantiques or in Ignace de Loyola’s Exercices spirituels. For those 
authors, taste means the power to identify marks of God here on 
earth. In Gracian, the word still has something of this theological 
sense, but its signification extends to social life. According to him 
taste is a sort of tact; so, in Gracian taste was not the sense of beau-
ty it became a century later. 
The same remarks concern Shaftesbury’s use of the word “taste.” 
According to him, taste is a flair for a good social life. Like politeness, 
taste stimulates civility, and favours public interest. It cultivates and 
develops honesty, goodwill, and urbanity. It is a social sense, which 
plays an important role in the civilisation process, by replacing 
rudeness and savagery of the past by manners and delicacy. 
As we can see, in the seventeenth century and even in the eight-
eenth century, taste is a sort of sense of sociability, indistinctly 
moral and aesthetic; it is very close to what we call “tact”, and it is 
not exclusively a sense of beauty.
Then, the question is: why, at a rather precise moment in histo-
ry, did taste become exclusively the sense of beauty? To understand 
this change, I maintain that we must consider the great revolution, 
which affected the idea of beauty beetween the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth centuries. 
A NEW WAY TO CONSIDER BEAUTY
For us, beauty is usually defined as “what gives rise to an aesthet-
ic experience”. That is to say that beauty is conceived as the cause 
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of an aesthetic effect, the occasion of a specific pleasure. We can 
notice the circularity of this definition: beauty is what produces 
an aesthetic effect, and an aesthetic effect is an effect produced by 
beauty. We must above all insist on two points: first, beauty is de-
fined by its effects on the subject; secondly, those effects are ex-
clusively aesthetically pleasant. This could appear as a truism. For 
modern people, it is. But it has not always been the case. Beauty has 
not always been this narrow aesthetic category it became three cen-
turies ago. What was it before?
THE PRE-MODERN CONCEPTION OF BEAUTY
The most important characteristic of the pre-modern conception of 
beauty is to conceive sensitive beauty as depending on a transcend-
ence, and not as an autonomous reality. Sensitive beauty comes 
from something other than itself; it comes from something high-
er. So, according to Plato or Plotin, sensitive beauty only exists 
through its link to the intelligible Idea of beauty, that is to say, to 
Beauty in oneself, which gives beauty to different things, whilst 
staying the same. This unique origin explains the relationship be-
tween the beautiful things in spite of their individual specificities 
(a beautiful face, a beautiful tree, a beautiful house…). The idea of 
beauty printed on man during his celestial existence remains in his 
soul and allows him to recognize visible beauty and to judge it in 
comparison to its intelligible model. So, Plato or Plotin did not ig-
nore sensitive beauty, but conceived it as a first step to reach oth-
er forms of superior beauties, more noble, more respectable: the 
beauty of the soul, of virtue, of knowledge, etc. Diotima’s speech 
in The Symposium by Plato describes this ascending process from 
corporeal beauties to spiritualised forms of beauty, to the very Idea 
of beauty, that is to say, to non-relational beauty, to absolute, un-
changing and eternal beauty. 
During the Middle Ages, Christian thinkers went on with this 
vertical conception of beauty by conceiving beauty as a transcen-
dental property of Being, and more precisely of the supreme Being 
who is God. God is then the supra-subtantial beauty, and sensitive 
things are beautiful because they come from him. Aesthetic real-
ities are then theophanic; beauty is indistinct sensitive and met-
aphysical splendour. This supra-sensitive origin allows to easily 
conceive notions of “interior beauty”, of “spiritual beauty” or of 
“splendour of the soul”: “interior beauty shines brighter than all 
extrinsic ornaments even brighter than royal jewellery,” wrote St 
Bernard in one of his sermons. 
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This transcendental origin of beauty gives it another important 
characteristic: its close links to good and truth. The kaloskaga-
tia of ancient Greece closely linked sensitive and spiritual beauty 
to the good. Christian thought during the Middle Ages consid-
ered that beauty does not differ from good nor truth, in the mesure 
where God is at the same time Beauty, Good and Truth. Those val-
ues become mixed up in the supreme Being; they are predicaments 
of God. They are identical in God and differ only by the manner 
in which man considers them. As Thomas wrote: “good has a spe-
cial report to appetite. And for this reason, it could be considered 
from the point of view of finality; because appetite is, so to speak, 
a particular impetus towards the thing.”1 On the other hand, beau-
ty depends on cognitive virtue: indeed, things which are declared 
beautiful are those which please people when they are observed. 
The difference between beauty and good only appears from a hu-
man point of view: for men, Good is the supreme Being in its co-
native dimension, beauty is the supreme Being in its perceptual 
dimension. But in the supreme Being – in God -, they are one; 
Beauty and Good are equivalent and convertible.
The third characteristic of this ancient conception of beau-
ty results from the preceding two: that is, its objectivity. Saint 
Augustine’s answer to the question: “are things beautiful because 
they provide pleasure to men, or do they provide pleasure to men 
because they are beautiful?” is clear: “without any hesitation, I an-
swer: they provide pleasure to men because they are beautiful.”2 
Beauty is objective as Good is objective. Neither of them needs 
man to exist. As Albert le Grand put it, “virtue possesses in itself a 
brightness, which constitutes its beauty, even if nobody were pres-
ent to see or appreciate it.”3 Beautiful things like good things re-
main beautiful and good, even if the human being is absent. In 
other words, it is not a subjective agreement that makes them exist. 
Both exist independently of human perception. Men meet them but 
do not create them. Beauty is ontologically self-necessary and pos-
sesses an objective consistency, which according to Saint Thomas 
consists in integritas, consonantia and claritas: beautiful is what is 
without lack, what is well-proportioned and what is radiant. 
This metaphysical conception of beauty, with small differences 
between these authors, remains constant in European culture from 
Antiquity to the beginning of modern times. Conceiving beauty as 
the imperfect reflection of the Idea of Beauty (Plato), as triumph 
of the spirit on the matter (Plotinus), as the emanent ray of the face 
of God (Christian neo-platonism), in all these cases sensitive beau-
ty is linked to transcendental beauty, objective and absolute, and 
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without the latter, sensitive beauty will not exist. So, beauty is not 
an exclusively aesthetic term and cannot be thought outside of a 
metaphysics of beauty. 
THE MODERN THOUGHT OF BEAUTY
It is precisely with this understanding of beauty as intelligible re-
ality, moral harmony and metaphysical splendour, that moderni-
ty terminates. Contrary to Augustine’s answer to the question “are 
things beautiful because they provide pleasure to men, or do they 
provide pleasure to men because they are beautiful?” modernity re-
plies that they are beautiful because they provide pleasure.
To understand such a reversal, one must consider a larger revo-
lution, which happened between the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, and which deeply affected the way in which the world 
was considered and understood. Indeed, the new episteme, which 
appears during the classical age conceives the sensitive world in a 
radically new way. In short, this sensitive world, made of colorful, 
ponderous, sonorous, odorous objects became subjective, that is to 
say that it only exists for a human subject. Partisans of corpuscu-
lar mechanical physics (Galilei, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, Newton, 
etc.) supported that secondary qualities, that is to say qualities we 
perceive by a single sense (blue, high pitch, bitter, rough…), do not 
exist in the object. Sugar is in itself neither white nor sweet; white-
ness and sweetness do not exist without the sensations. In itself 
sugar is a mere specific configuration of material particles. The 
particular sensations felt by the subject happen when his sensorial 
recepters are in contact with a specific spatial disposition of mov-
ing material particles. Objectively only does this microstructure 
exist. Saying that an object is blue, smooth or perfumed is saying 
that its molecular structure is so disposed that it in humans causes 
particular visual or tactile sensations.
This scientific revolution had considerable consequences for 
the question of beauty. At the beginning, this new understanding 
of the sensitive world did not affect the question of beauty. It was 
not until the eighteenth century that the effects of this scientific 
revolution clearly appeared. 
Particularly important for this question was the publication 
of An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue by 
Hutcheson. In Hutcheson’s book, we can read the decisive sen-
tence: “in this book beauty is taken as the idea it arouses in us.” 
What does this sentence actually say? That beauty is not an Idea in 
a platonic sense, but an idea in the modern sense of the word, that 
is to say a content of the mind, and nothing more than a content of 
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the mind. Beauty does not exist without the human subject. It is an 
idea without capital, and not a real characteristic of some objects in 
the world. It is only subjective, that is to say that it correlates with a 
particular mental state and it is nothing outside of that state. In this 
way Hutcheson wrote, “if no conscious spirit with a sense of beau-
ty exists to contemplate those objects that we say are beautiful, I do 
not see how we could call them beautiful.”4 
Beauty is no longer conceived as a property of the object; even 
less as an echo in the sensitive things of the eternal Idea of beauty. 
Beauty is a relational quality, which arises when some objects meet 
human subjects; it is an idea produced in us through contact with 
particular corpuscular properties of matter.
Beauty is no longer an essence; beautiful things just exist. 
Beauty has no more ontological consistency; subjective agreement 
does not follow it but is formed by it. Montesquieu put it very clear-
ly in his Essai sur le goût  : “the ancients […] considered as posi-
tive qualities all the qualities related to our soul; so much so that 
those dialogues where Plato presented Socrates’s reasoning, the 
dialogues so admired by the ancients, are nowadays indefensible 
because they are based on a false philosophy: because those rea-
sonings on good, beauty, perfection, rationality, madness, hard-
ness, softness, dryness, dampness, considered as positive things, 
no longer make sense.”5
As a consequence of this subjectivisation of beauty, the 
pre-modern characteristics of beauty vanished: its transcendence, 
its verticality, its supra-sensitive origin. The question of beauty 
falls outside ontotheological abilities. The experience of beauty 
is no longer a metaphysical experience of the world. So, the physi-
co-theological proof of God’s existence, which appealed to beauty 
and to the harmony of the world is no more practicable, as we can 
see in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779).
This subjectivisation of beauty also signifies the ending of the 
convertibility of the Transcendentals. Indeed, when beauty does 
not have any transcendental origin, it becomes independent of good 
as well as truth. Hutcheson replaced the objective analogy between 
beauty and good with a subjective analogy: the one that exists be-
tween the sense of beauty and the sense of good, in other words, 
between two human faculties and two psychological processes of 
judgment. In 1711, Shaftesbury still wrote in Characteristics: “what 
is beautiful is harmonious and well-proportioned; what is harmo-
nious and well-proportioned is true; what is at the same time beau-
tiful and true is consequently pleasant and good.”6 In 1715, Crouzat 
in his Traité du beau, or, in 1719, Dubos in his Réflexions critiques 
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sur la poésie et la peinture, still combined beauty and good in the 
same original nature; but the separation became even more distinct 
during the eighteenth century. At its end, Kant firmly theorized this 
separation in the first chapter of his Kritik der Urteilskraft, in iso-
lating the beautiful, the pleasant and the good. Formulas like “a 
fine action” or “a beautiful soul” are still employed, but the use of 
the adjective is now metaphorical, or is becoming metaphorical. 
So is the double phenomenon of beauty aestheticisation pro-
duced by the modern subjectivist, psychological an empirical per-
spective: beauty is nothing more than beauty, and it does not exist 
without a sensitive experience. 
THE AESTHETICISATION OF TASTE
The phenomonon of the aesthetisation of beauty enables us to un-
derstand both the emergence and the extent of the new notion of 
taste during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
As we have seen above, until this period taste had an indissolu-
bly ethic and aesthetic signification. Such an intermingling could 
not survive the end of the objective analogy between beauty and 
good. Besides, those deep changes affecting the nature of beau-
ty highlighted the question of its perception and its appreciation. 
Indeed, when beauty is no longer conceived as the sensitive per-
ception of a transcendent Idea or of the divine perfection, in other 
words, when it becomes aesthetic in a double sense (only relative 
to beauty and only relative to the sensitive world), by which human 
faculty could it then be comprehended? 
Dubos’ book Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture, 
published in 1719, is very interesting regarding this issue. Dubos 
examines the correct way to judge the value of poetic and pictori-
al works. So, he speaks about artistic achievement and not about 
natural beauties; nevertheless, what he maintains about the first 
ones could be applied to the second ones. Being in line with the de-
bate opposing partisans of reason to partisans of feeling, Dubos 
supported the latter. He maintains that the merits of a poem or a 
painting are not appreciated by the mind, which evaluates its con-
formity with the rules of the art of painting or poetry, but by the 
heart, which directly feels those merits: “Do we reason to know 
whether the stew is good or bad? Do we ever discuss the proportion 
of its ingredients after having determined their respective quali-
ties and the geometrical principle of flavour to decide if the stew 
is good? We never do that. There is in ourselves a sense to know 
if the cook has made his dishes according to the rules of the art of 
cooking. We taste the stew, and even without knowing those rules 
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we know if it is good. It is also the case with books and paintings 
that aim to delight in moving us. There is in us a sense designed to 
judge the merits of those works imitating natural moving objects.”7 
Dubos does not call this sense of artistic achievement “taste” but 
“feeling”. However, the analogy he makes between the process of 
culinary judgment and the process of artistic judgment installs the 
sensoriality in the aesthetic: the understanding of beauty is the 
work of a sense.
For all who have adopted the new episteme beauty exists only 
by the human being. His sense of beauty really has characteristics 
of taste in a non-figurative sense, in that it supposes a sensitive 
contact and never decides on beauty without the presence of the ob-
ject. Like taste in a non-figurative sense, the human sense of beauty 
decides immediately without the intervention of the intellect. Like 
the first, the latter never gives up in front of reasons, and its verdict 
is unwavering. This is what Hutcheson calls its necessity: “no reso-
lution from our part, nor any perspective of an advantage or an in-
convenience can change the beauty or the ugliness of an object.”8 
No more than I could find bitter the honey, or sweet the lemon, can 
I find beautiful a house that is only convenient, or ugly the most 
beautiful of angels when he is Lucifer. In Kantian terms, judgment 
on beauty cannot be determined by a priori reasons (for example, 
by the rules of beauty fixed by the Academy), neither by a posteri-
ori reasons (for example, by the concensus of voices). Thoses re-
semblances explain that the term of taste was retained to design 
this new sense of beauty.
So, there is a sense of beauty, which has the same name as one 
of the five senses, but is not one of them. This sixth sense is close 
to the five senses, but it differs from them by an essential trait: it is 
an internal sense, without any specific organ, and it decides on the 
testimony of sight and hearing.
Refusing a role to the understanding in the experience of beauty 
is the consequence in the subject of the manner to conceive beauty, 
truth and good in the object. Their unbinding does not signify that 
beauty and good do not have any relationship: many authors con-
sidered the experience of beauty as generating effects in favour of 
moral tendencies. Thus, Hume argues that beauty soothes the sav-
age impulses to the extent that taste refinement contributes to so-
ciability, to calm passions and to sympathy. Let us also remember 
that Kant considered beauty as “the symbol of morality.”9 Even if 
it is reduced to a sense of mere beauty, taste can be considered as 
stimulating benevolence and civility, or as a propaedeutics of mo-
rality. But those considerations must not mask the radical change, 
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which happened in those times: taste became sense of beauty, only 
sense of beauty and sense of mere beauty. Of course, the develop-
ment of this sense must be favourable toward morality or sociabil-
ity, but only indirectly. 
The soul needs a specific faculty for beauty, as Sulzer and 
many others maintained. If, as Hutcheson puts it, we have a sense 
of beauty and a sense of good that present similarities in their re-
spective processes but which are distinct, we have to designate 
them by different names. So, the term ‘taste’ became specialized 
to designate this ‘internal sense’ that is the sense of beauty. It is 
progressively adopted by everybody and became an indispensable 
philosophical concept. So, in his book Theorie der schönen Künste 
und Wissenschaften, Just Riedel wrote “Man has three finalities on 
which his spiritual perfection is founded: Truth, Good and Beauty; 
for each of them nature gave him a particular faculty: for truth, 
common sense, for good, conscience, and for beauty, taste.”10
Thus, while in the sixteenth century taste was not yet an aesthec-
tic category, it became progressively the sense of beauty during 
the eighteenth century and occupied the front of the theoretical 
stage. So much so that the new discipline we call “aesthetics” is de-
signed by Kant by the expression of “critique of taste”. This aes-
theticisation of taste is one of the consequences of the underground 
ontological revolution, which led to transform the transcendental 
essences into human values, and to the unbinding of beauty, truth 
and good which followed. For this beauty which is only for man 
and which is only beauty, it needs a non-intelligible but sensitive 
faculty: a sense, a sixth sense, without specific organ, but which 
possesses the same characteristics as the five senses: naturality, 
universality, immediacy, and assurance of its verdict. 
The invention of taste is the consequence of the aestheticisation 
of beauty. In this context, taste is not only the faculty which enables 
us to grasp beauty: it is the faculty that gives birth to beauty, seeing 
beauty as no longer having a proper ontological consistency. This 
is the reason why the notion of taste became so important: the en-
quiry could no longer focus on beauty or on beautiful things, but 
had to focus on subjective affections by which, and only by which, 
beauty exists. Kant’s Critique of Judgement is, in this regard, re-
markable: here, the enquiry on beauty became an enquiry on taste 
judgment. An anthropology of the aesthetic experience replaced 
the metaphysics of beauty. In the first paragraph of his book Kant 
wrote “only Germans use the word ‘aesthectics’ to designate what 
others called critique of taste.”
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The new conception of beauty and the new definition of taste which 
follows explain in their turn the first appearance of other concepts. 
This is the case with the notion of disinterestedness. Actually, the 
notion of disinterestedness is only understandable in connection 
with taste. 
Why? As we have seen in paragraph 33 of the Critique of 
Judgement, taste can oppose an individual preference with collec-
tive norms of judgment. That is to say that taste becomes subjec-
tive not only in that it only exists for a subject, but also in that it can 
oppose an individual to his community. However, eighteenth cen-
tury authors speak about taste and not about tastes, and considers 
taste as something that makes humans come closer to each other 
and not as something that splits them. So, Burke maintains in his 
A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful (1757), that taste has “fixed principles” and responds 
to “sure and invariable rules”. In other words, taste, as the other 
senses, is identical in every man. Consequently, how to reconcile 
the claim of the naturality – and thus of the universality – of taste, 
and the observation of the variety of tastes? 
The eighteenth-century authors answer first that the variety of 
appreciations concerning beauty can be explained by physiolog-
ical differences between humans. A colour-blind person sees as 
green things that other people see as red because of a deficiency 
in the colour sensing cones of his or her eyes. If somebody hears 
a sound that someone else does not hear, it is because the hearing 
of the first is better. As we can have a more or less piercing sight, 
a more or less sharp hearing or a more or less refined palate (like 
Sancho Panza’s parents, in the episode of Don Quixote quoted by 
Hume in his “Of the Standard of Taste”), we can have a sense of 
beauty that is more or less naturally developed. But this is not the 
only reason for the differences in appreciations concerning beauty. 
Divergences can also come from different forms of personal inter-
est combined with aesthetic appreciation. In this case, taste judg-
ment becomes impure.
Because beauty is independent of other values as utility, con-
venience, or truth, we must avoid bringing into play extra aesthet-
ic values. Thus, Hutcheson carefully distinguishes the pleasure of 
beauty from “the joy generated by the prospect of advantages.”11 
Regardless of the prospect of an advantage or of a disadvantage 
for us, we cannot find an ugly object beautiful, or a beautiful ob-
ject ugly. Even if we know the good properties of a bitter medi-
cine we cannot sense it as sweet. Of course, as Hutcheson puts it, 
the pleasant prospect of a relief joined with the present pain could 
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give the ingestion of this bitter medicine an overall positive valen-
cy; but this positivity comes from the idea of relief and not from 
the mere sensation. 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement also insists on the necessary dis-
tinction between different sorts of satisfaction. The satisfaction 
that is produced by beauty is not the one that is produced by good: 
beauty delights, but good is esteemed.12 So appeared the new no-
tion of disinterestedness. Considering goodness or utility of an ob-
ject supposes that we are interested in the existence of this object. 
Because beauty has been unbound from good, the experience of 
the first must be distinguished from the experience of the latter. 
Thus, the judgment of taste must be disinterested. It does not 
signify of course that we do not have any interest in the object con-
sidered, but that we do not have any extra-aesthetic interest in it. In 
other words, we must exclude personal interests (convenience, ad-
vantages, memories, etc.), as well as human interests (intellectual, 
political, ethical, etc.). Because the autonomy of beauty demands the 
autonomy of taste, disinterestedness became a new crucial concept. 
 
CONCLUSION
The scientific revolution, which promoted a mechanical-corpus-
cular conception of matter, seemed very far from aesthetics and 
the philosophy of art. Nevertheless, I maintain that it is this sci-
entific revolution that explains the appearance and the pregnancy 
of the concept of taste in the eighteenth century. It is the aesthet-
icisation of beauty that explains the aestheticisation of taste, and 
consequently, the appearance of the new idea of disinterrestedness. 
The aestheticisation of beauty also impacted on the new category 
of fine arts. Indeed, in considering beauty – from now on isolated 
from good and truth – as the main aim of art, the eighteenth century 
achieved the aestheticisation of art. But this subject oversteps my 
present topic. I will just underline the underground links that join 
all these conceptual innovations: taste, disinterrestedness, fine 
arts, and also genius and public. This new notional plan is linked to 
new institutions (for example the Salons) and new disciplines (Art 
criticism, Art history and Aesthetics). So, the modern paradigm of 
art was established out of a nebula composed of classificatory cat-
egories, of beliefs about its aims, about the uses and values of its 
objects, of manners of conceiving their producers, their addressees, 
the places where the art works are exhibited, the institutions where 
they are produced, etc. 
The Aestheticisation of Taste, a Consequence of the “Aestheticisation” of Beauty
74
The conceptual categories that are so attacked by contempo-
rary art today, but which are still ours, thus originate from the very 
complex but very consistent paradigm that took shape during the 
Enlightenment.
1 St Thomas, Somme théologique, XIIIth c., Prima pars, 
question 11.
2 St Augustin, De vera religione, 390, chap. 32.
3 St Albert the Great, Commentary on the Divine Names, 
XIIIth c., Chapter 4: De Pulchro et Bono.
4 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725, I, I, 16.
5  Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Essai sur le goût, 1757.
6 A. A. C. Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 1711, III.
7 J.-B. Dubos, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la 
peinture, 1719. 
8 Hutcheson, op. cit., I, 1, 13.
9   Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, 1790, § 59.
10 Friedrich Justus Riedel, Theorie der schönen Künste 
 und Wissenschaften, 1767.
11 Hutcheson, op. cit., I, I, § XIV.
12 Kant, op. cit., § 5.
NOTES
Carole Talon-Hugon
